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This conference has its own historical memories, its own historical
predecessor and its own historical artifacts. The memories are in the minds of
people in this room and thousands more who could not be here with us, women
and men who were part of the transformations of ideas and practices that recast
what we thought we knew at the turn of the 1970s.
Its direct predecessor was the conference on "Women and the Law,"
funded in part by the Carnegie Corporation, that brought together students and
law teachers here in New Haven in the spring of 1971. Young, feisty and
marginal, the attendance list named participants in alphabetical order and
therefore without hierarchy (there were those who would have described such a
list as "promiscuous" in its nineteenth-century meaning, of an undiscriminating
mixture, even though students' names were marked by the letter "S"). The
names on the list now dazzle: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Herma Hill Kay, Janet Benshoof, Carol Bellamy. Five men were there in
solidarity and out of shared interests: among them Jack Getman, who would
have a distinguished career in labor law, and Leo Kanowitz, who had already
written the only monograph on the subject: Women and the Law. The
Unfinished Revolution.' The artifacts are the first two casebooks on sex
discrimination and the law, almost all of whose authors are here with us
tonight, and their predecessor: a fragile 34-page mimeographed packet that was
circulated at the conference. Its title was "Women and the Law: A Collection
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of Reading Lists"; its improvisational spirit is suggested by the confession on
the table of contents that "due to a page numbering mistake" there is no page
32.2
The circulation of reading lists was a strategy of feminist scholars in the
early 1970s. As we engaged in the invention of a subject that our seniors were
certain did not exist, we needed to know that we were not alone, and we needed
each other's advice. Syllabi circulated in samizdat.3  They represented not
merely bureaucratic paper but intellectual struggle. The phrase "women and
the law" is actually a placeholder, implying that women might have a different
relationship to the law than do men, but unclear about what that relationship
might be. What are the components of "sex discrimination"? Where should
one look to find it? Drafts of reading lists were a way of maintaining the
conversation. The compilers of this packet-Barbara Bowman (who later
would use Barbara A. Babcock as her professional name), Ann Freedman,
Eleanor Norton (as she then signed herself), Susan Ross, "and friends"-did
more than staple things together. They clarified the landscape, sorting the
generic "women and the law" into sites: constitutional law, criminal law,
employment law, public accommodations, abortion, education. Family law,
where (if they thought about it at all) most scholars placed all "women's law,"
was only one of many categories, way down on the list.
Casebooks, by contrast, are not fragile; they are notoriously thick and
heavy. They are the workhorses of the legal profession. Practitioners want the
latest work, the current state of the argument. When new editions appear, old
volumes are pulled off office shelves and replaced by new ones. (My own
library contains the second edition of one of these casebooks because a
colleague donated what she regarded as redundant.) Even major libraries are
known to deaccession. The assumption is that the old volumes are outdated
and no longer interesting. But the casebooks that emerged from the flyaway
paper of the conference still breathe the energy with which they were written. 4
The compilers of the conference packet reappear as the editors of Sex
Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies, published by Little, Brown
in 1975-and funded in part by the same Carnegie Corporation grant that had
made the "Women and the Law" conference possible.5  Next to it on the
shelves sits Text, Cases, and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination,
2. 1 am grateful to Mary Clark and Ann Freedman for providing a copy of this ephemeral
document.
3. This circulation was characteristic of other fields as well-history, English, psychology. In the
early 1970s, a short-lived company, KNOW, Inc., published the most widely circulated syllabi, giving
them more exposure.
4. They can now be bought through rare book lists like www.abebooks.com and
www. bibliofind com.
5. BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, ANN E. FREEDMAN, ELEANOR NORTON, & SUSAN DELLER Ross,
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975) (hereinafter SEX
DISCRIMINATION).
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constructed by three other conference participants (Kenneth Davidson, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Herma Hill Kay) and published by West Publishing
6Company a year earlier.
Although their bindings were no different from casebooks on Torts, on
Property, on Contracts by the same publishers, the sex discrimination
casebooks breathe a distinctive spirit from their opening pages. The authors
did not need a historian to tell them that their relationship to the reader was
freshly invented. Their excitement, their gutsiness, their desire to challenge
established practices rings through their pages. This is especially true of Sex
Discrimination and the Law, which begins with the words: "This is not a usual
law school text. It did not grow out of the scholarly interests of law professors,
but rather had its genesis in student-generated courses in Women and the Law."
Then it goes on, as some people in this room know, to tell us that "the first such
course was taught in the fall of 1969 at New York University Law School, and
Susan Ross was one of its initiators." That's just the "right" time: uptown at
Bamard, Annette Baxter had initiated one of the very first courses in U.S.
women's history in 1966; thereafter courses in women's studies proliferated
throughout the liberal arts curriculum. 7 "Women students at Yale, including
Ann Freedman, learned about the NYU course, taught it themselves at Yale in
the spring of 1970 and, for the spring of 1971, prevailed upon the faculty to
hire Barbara Babcock, who had been teaching the course at Georgetown ' 8 to
teach it with Ann Freedman. Once a week, Babcock left her public defender's
job in Washington D.C. to fly to New Haven; "the switch in cities," she
recalled years later, "seemed minor compared to the shift in causes. ' 9
Meanwhile, Eleanor Holmes Norton was teaching the course at NYU Law
School. Soon after, a Women and the Law Clinic was taught at NYU by
Kristen Booth Glen and Ann Garfinkle.' 0 Gladys Kessler-now known for her
challenging decisions as a judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbiall-took time from private practice to teach a seminar at George
Washington Law School with Susan Ross; Kenneth Davidson was hedging the
question of where the course belonged in the curriculum by teaching a course at
6. KENNETH DAVIDSON, RUTH BADER GINSBURG, & HERNIA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (Ist ed. 1974) (subsequent editions by Herma Hill Kay: 2d
ed. 1981, 3d ed. 1988; and by Herma Hill Kay & Martha S. West: 4th ed. 1996, 5th ed. 2002)
(hereinafter SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION).
7. In 1969 Leo Kanowitz taught "Women and the Law" at the University of New Mexico. The
expansion of these courses, from 100 in 1969 to 4,658 in 1974 (counting only those in accredited
colleges and universities, including many law schools but not including thousands more in continuing
education programs, alternative feminist educational institutions and women's centers) can be traced in
another rare book: TAMAR BERKOWITZ, JEAN MANGI, & JANE WILLIAMSON, WHO'S WHO AND WHERE
IN WOMEN'S STUDIES (1974).
8. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5.
9. Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz, Constitution-Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991).
10. This information from Elizabeth Schneider to author (Dec. 2002).
11. See, e.g, Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94
(D.D.C. 2002) (ordering government to release names of post-9/1 I detainees).
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SUNY Buffalo to a class that was half undergraduates, half law students. At
the urging of Boalt Hall women students, some of whom had attended the Yale
conference, Colquitt Meacham Walker, who was working at the Legal Aid
Society of Alameda County, came to Boalt Hall to teach Women and the Law.
Herma Hill Kay sat in on the course and later taught it herself as she worked on
the casebook. Among the students who had urged that the course be offered
were Mary Dunlap, Nancy Davis, and the recently graduated Wendy Webster
Williams, who were peers at Boalt Hall but had not known each other well
before the Yale conference. While attending it, they conceived the idea of a
women's law firm, and when Nancy Davis graduated the three formed Equal
Rights Advocates, Inc., a pioneering women's rights firm in San Francisco, that
will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2004.12 Shortly after founding ERA, Inc,
Wendy Webster Williams recalls, "we-the three of us, supplemented by
Barbara Babcock at Stanford-took the Yale materials on the law school
circuit, teaching women and law seminars at Stanford, Santa Clara, the
University of San Francisco and Golden Gate University Schools of Law."'
' 3
The feistiness of these courses-responsive to student demands, often with a
clear sense of connection not only to undergraduate but high school and "non-
school" (i.e., continuing adult education) courses-bound teachers and their
students together as they enacted the grassroots collective dynamics of 1970s
feminism.
Sex Discrimination and the Law was unlike most casebooks in that its
authors were not full-time academics. While she was writing, Eleanor Holmes
Norton was also chairing the New York City Human Rights Commission.
Though she was only in her early 30s, she had unusually hard-earned political
experience, dating back to risky work in Mississippi ten years before; she
brought a great deal of political skill to the complicated political job in an
exposed political position. As Chair of the Commission, Norton developed a
language of claims that could be brought against the state by all people,
including but not limited to women and minorities, who felt themselves denied
equal treatment of the laws. Norton refused to permit people to play identity
politics, or to use the language of comparative oppressions. Hers was a major
intellectual as well as legal contribution that has yet to be fully appreciated.
Susan Deller Ross was an attorney at the Equal Employment Opportunity
12. A fourth founding member, Joan Messing Graff, is now president of the Legal Aid Society of
San Francisco. See the ERA website: www.equalrights.org. In 2002, ERA Inc was concentrating its
attention on its Tradeswomen [in construction] Legal Advocacy Project, High-Tech [electronics]
Sweatshop Project, Restaurant Discrimination Project, Higher Education Legal Advocacy Project, and
its Retail Discrimination Project, notably representing plaintiffs in the class action suit Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. 2002). Mary Dunlap was appointed Director of the
Office of Citizen Complaints, San Francisco's independent police watchdog agency, in 1996; it was a
controversial appointment, putting an outspoken civil liberties lawyer in a position traditionally held by
men associated with law enforcement agencies. Mary Dunlap died, age 54, in January 2003. A few
days later, Nancy Davis was swom in as San Francisco Superior Court Judge.
13. E-mail from Wendy Webster Williams to author (Dec. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
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Commission, which had recently committed itself to vigorous pursuit of sex
discrimination cases. Barbara Babcock had the emotionally intense job of
Director of the Public Defender Service in the District of Columbia; toward the
end of the period she left to be the first woman on the regular faculty at
Stanford Law School. Ann Freedman was busy founding a feminist law firm in
Philadelphia. Thus the field was claimed, surveyed and designed by students
and marginally employed young lawyers; the making of the courses, the
pamphlets and then the casebooks forced the specialty into existence. Years
later, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg reflected on her own experiences developing
the other "first" casebook-Sex-Based Discrimination-while she was
simultaneously inventing the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, teaching first
at Rutgers and then at Columbia Law School, litigating cases, and raising small
children-she observed, "it was wonderful, it was invigorating, and we were
always tired.'
14
It is unusual for a casebook to warn readers, as did the authors of Sex
Discrimination, that they will encounter "explicit bias." The authors wrote as
members of the first substantial cohort of women lawyers to seek professional
identities collectively. Their predecessors had emerged from law schools into
the 1920s in pairs and triplets, into a political context already in retreat from the
feminist claims of the pre-World War I era. They had their own now-forgotten
hard-fought battles that laid the foundation for much that was done in the
1970s. For example, women attorneys were not admitted to the New York Bar
Association until 1937, some 17 years after suffrage and even more since
women had been able to earn law degrees in New York City. Women attorneys
took the lead in demanding that women have both the right and the obligation
to serve on juries. The Second Wave feminist cohort built on these
foundations. These women entered a landscape already refrained by the civil
rights and anti-war movements; from these movements they learned argument,
rhetoric and strategy. Still, it was not easy. Against an intellectual context that
decried identity politics, against an academy that decried identity-driven
research subjects and held that the woman who wished to succeed ought to
keep her distance from women's subjects, the casebook authors wrote frankly
out of their own need to understand the grounding of feminism and to challenge
the rules that made their own employment problematic, their entry into clubs
and bars embarrassing, their presence in the courtroom a matter for finger-
pointing and marginalizing comments. The issues they addressed in the
casebooks were simultaneously abstract and personal: "We believe that women
suffer inequality, reinforced and at times created by laws, and that law can also
be used to remedy many of these inequities .... We have presented a feminist
14. See LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 204 (1998).
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view of most of the issues raised in the chapters which follow." 15 The authors
of Sex-Based Discrimination took the unusual step of inserting in the midst of
the text a section headed "a personal note" detailing the reasons for their own
support of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The ERA, they maintained,
would eliminate the historical impediment to unqualified judicial
recognition of equal rights and responsibilities for men and women as
constitutional principle; it would end legislative inertia that keeps
discriminatory laws on the books... and it would serve as a clear
statement of the nation's moral and legal commitment to a system in
which women and men stand as full and equal individuals before the
law.
16
Unlike other casebooks to that time-although the practice is now quite
common-these books included not only briefs and opinions, but also popular
magazine articles and other historical, economic and sociological materials.
Even before the text proper began, right after the standard table of cases, Sex-
Based Discrimination offered a page of "Selected References" that placed the
volume in an intellectual context that began with John Stuart Mill's Subjection
of Women (1869) and went on to Margaret Mead's Sex and Temperament
(1935), Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949), Eleanor Flexner's
Century of Struggle (1959), Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963) and
Woman in Sexist Society, a feisty collection of women's liberation essays. 17 It
also drew on articles in Science and Notes from the Third Year, as well as a
speech by Olof Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden. Sex Discrimination and
the Law included recently published selections from Business Week, Saturday
Review, and The New Republic. Both included selections from the recently
invented Ms. Even as the editors worked, things were changing around them;
one gets the sense that they would have been more comfortable had the binding
been loose-leaf from the beginning.
Among the many practices these feminists sought to destabilize, exclusion
from public places was one that hit close to home. The authors of Sex-Based
Discrimination embedded it into the section on employment, emphasizing that
many places marked "private" were in fact locations where business was
conducted or relationships forged that would be useful in economic terms. The
Yale authors of Sex Discrimination and the Law-themselves excluded from
Mory's (the private club that still continues to serve as Yale's primary social
spot for faculty)-made exclusion from public places their culminating topic.
The authors emphasize that although sex discrimination was included as a
category in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was not included in
Title II, which barred discrimination in public accommodations. In the 1960s
the exclusion of women was widely understood to be a protective tactic,
15. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at v-vi.
16. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION, supra note 6, at 116.
17. Id. at xxxv.
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intended to protect "good" women from "bad" prostitutes, or from crude men
who were gambling or drinking, or in other ways serving "good" women's
interests. That the exclusion of women preserved male space and marked
women who moved into it as sexually promiscuous, inviting what we would
now call harassment, was less well understood.
Second wave feminists were more imaginative than they often have been
given credit for; they challenged physical exclusion on a combination of
personal and economic grounds. White feminists had been instructed by the
civil rights movement to name segregation when they saw it. To take the
position that segregation on the basis of sex had something in common with
segregation on the basis of race was a disruptive argument. Brenda Feigen's
memoir of the transition from all-female Vassar to Harvard Law School is
soaked with her resentment-still smoldering-of the places from which she
was excluded by her own school: the squash courts, secret clubs like Lincoln's
Inn, even some rooms of the Harvard Club in New York City on her wedding
day. 18 In New York City, Faith Seidenberg and her colleagues in NOW
brought suit against McSorley's Old Ale House-which had not served women
clients, whether or not escorted by a man, for 115 years. McSorley, Inc.
claimed it was a private place; since it needed a retail beer license, Judge
Walter Mansfield emphasized, they could not make that claim. Rather, he
wrote in his decision sustaining NOW's view of the matter, McSorley's-
which was, as the title of the case conveyed, a corporation, not a private
home-was "a commercial enterprise engaged in voluntarily serving the public
except for women."' 9 Mansfield went on:
Although the difference between the sexes has been the source of more
poetry and prose than almost any other phenomenon of life,
discrimination based on sex will be tolerated under the Equal
Protection Clause only if it bears a rational relation to a permissible
purpose of the classification.... Without suggesting that chivalry is
dead, we no longer hold to Shakespeare's immortal phrase "Frailty, thy
name is woman." Outdated images of bars as dens of coarseness and
iniquity and of women as peculiarly delicate and impressionable
creatures in need of protection from the rough and tumble of
20unvarnished humanity will no longer justify sexual separatism.
"Outdated" was gentle; such language glossed over the more pernicious
aspects of a "gentlemen's agreement" to exclude people unlike themselves.
Carol Greitzer introduced into the New York City Council a bill banning
discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sex; when it was
passed in 1970, it provided that exemptions might be granted on the bases of
18. BRENDA FEIGEN, NOT ONE OF THE BOYS: LIVING LIFE AS A FEMINIST 3-24 (2000).
19. Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc, 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
20. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 1045-46. Compare that Davidson and his colleagues put
McSorley's in the section on Labor Force Participation, emphasizing that the conversations that go on in
restricted places often concern business relationships.
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"bona fide considerations of public policy."1 As chair of the New York City
Commission on Human Rights, Eleanor Holmes Norton-barely six years out
of Yale Law School-had the responsibility of mediating numerous claims that
specific instances of discrimination were indeed reflections of such "bona fide
considerations."
The most delicious of these claims came from the New York Yankees. For
a century, the Yankees had sustained the practice of "Ladies' Day"-ten or
eleven times a season offering cheap tickets for women. Those who were
skeptical of the practice complained that Ladies' Day was an occasion to
encourage women to act in a silly way and to encourage men to treat women as
though they were silly. In the end, Eleanor Holmes Norton and the
Commission denied the Yankees and all other groups exemptions to equal
access law, except in places where patrons normally disrobe. And that is why
there hasn't been a Ladies' Day at a baseball game for a generation, and why
the whole concept will seem bizarre and arcane to anyone born after 1960,
especially all the female high school and college athletes now empowered by
Title IX.
22
So if you have a copy of either original casebook, treasure it as the
imaginative intellectual departure it was in the early 1970s, and keep it around
so that you can, from time to time, measure its distance from its successors.
Some of these successors are direct. When Kenneth Davidson moved into
government service and Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Herma Hill Kay took over
responsibility for Sex-Based Discrimination, publishing a second edition in
1981 and another in 1988; for the fourth and fifth editions, in 1996 and 2002,
she has been joined by Martha S. West of the University of California, Davis. 23
Barbara Babcock, Ann Freedman and Susan Deller Ross were joined in 1996
by Wendy Webster Williams, Rhonda Copelon, Deborah Rhode, and Nadine
Taub as authors of a full-scale successor volume to Sex Discrimination and the
Law. (Eleanor Holmes Norton was by then a delegate to Congress for the
District of Columbia.) A quarter-century after they had begun their first book,
the original authors now had extensive litigating experience of their own: Susan
Deller Ross and Wendy Webster Williams were instrumental in shaping the
theory and language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family and
Medical Leave Act. Nadine Taub had been extensively involved in the
development of laws regulating new reproductive technologies and
reproductive choice, and Rhonda Copelon's international work is reflected in
her section on reproductive and sexual rights. The authors' claims were now
21. Id. at 1057-59.
22. See Abosh v. New York Yankees, Inc., No CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (New York State
Human Rights Appeal Board, July 19, 1972), quoted in SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 1069-
1070.
23. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION, supra note 6.
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confident; they could speak not only of "causes and remedies" of a harm that
many of their readers were not sure existed, but rather of the "history, practice
and theory" of a recognized and respected field. They were certain that there
remained "many manifestations of female disadvantage in our society.',
24
I have not attempted a content analysis of the differences between the
subsequent editions and the original casebooks; the authors themselves no
doubt could do this much more easily than I. But to browse the subsequent
editions is to watch the editing of a story and the gradual development of a
canon, as authors struggle to absorb new litigation, new decisions, and to shape
the ways the next generation of law students would engage the subject of sex
discrimination.
How is a canon made? It's helpful to watch what happens to Sail'er Inn v.
Kirby,25 the first major holding that excluding women from employment (in
this case, from tending bar) could be a denial of rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the California
Constitution, which had provided, back in 1879, that "No person shall on
account of sex be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful
business, vocation, or profession." As law clerk for California Supreme Court
Associate Justice Raymond Peters, Wendy Webster Williams, then in her mid-
20s, helped interpret what had transpired in the courtroom. Barbara Babcock
read the "bold new case" on one of her flights from Washington, D.C. to New
Haven; years later Babcock would remember being thrilled but also "that the
presence of the old clause in the new case irritated me because it made the
ground-breaking equal protection discussion largely superfluous. And, as I told
my class, the clause itself was no doubt a sport, not likely to be replicated in
other state constitutions. ' '2 6 Early in the 1990s, Babcock would search out the
origins of that clause, and would establish that it was not at all "a sport," but
rather the result of an intensely waged campaign by California suffragists, led
by Clara Shortridge Foltz, the first woman to be admitted to the California Bar.
Foltz's own suit for admission to the University of California's new school of
law in 1879 was buttressed by a major lobbying campaign to persuade the
California Constitutional Convention, sitting at the same time, to approve
clauses in the state constitution that opened all departments of the state
university to women, and, it followed logically, opened to them the practice of
all lawful professions. 27
Sail 'er Inn was carefully covered in the first editions of Sex Discrimination
and the Law and Sex-Based Discrimination. But despite Wendy Williams'
24. BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, ANN E. FREEDMAN, SUSAN DELLER Ross, WENDY WEBSTER
WILLIAMS, RHONDA COPELON, DEBORAH L. RHODE, & NADINE TAUB, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY xliii-xlvi (1996) (hereinafter SEX DISCRIMINATION 2D).
25. 485 P.2d 529(1971).
26. Babcock, supra note 9, at 850.
27. Id. at 852-54.
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involvement, Sail'er Inn was reduced to a bare notice in the edition whose
editorial group she had joined.28 Seidenberg v. McSorley slid out of the index.
Herma Hill Kay kept Sail'er Inn as a significant entry in the 1981 edition; by
the 1988 edition, however, it had slid to a mention. Seidenberg went even
faster: reduced to a mention in 1981, gone by 1988. The case books testify, I
suspect, that anger at denial of access to public accommodation was eroding as
battles were won; Ladies' Day had been erased in practice, so Abosh v. New
York Yankees was less important for new lawyers to learn. Women now went
to lunch at Mory's (although the photographs on the wall remained largely
male).
Twenty years of experience necessarily meant that fresh choices about
inclusion would have to be made; twenty years of argument meant much more
complexity attached to each topic addressed by a casebook. Sometimes the
differences between the two editions reflect simply the passage of time. Roe v.
Wade2 9 and Doe v. Bolton had only recently been handed down when the first
editions of Sex-Based Discrimination and Sex Discrimination went to press; the
editors at first could do little more than include lengthy extracts from the
decisions. But the differences could also mean alternate conceptualizations.
By 1996, the second edition of Sex Discrimination and the Law devoted nearly
200 pages to tracing argument about reproductive rights understood generally
and to the "Gender Implications of Reproductive Modes and Technologies,"
including sterilization, in vitro fertilization and surrogacy. In the early 1970s,
the agenda for those who would challenge discrimination on the basis of sex
had seemed relatively straightforward; indeed, it is now widely appreciated that
many of the plaintiffs for landmark arguments were men who complained of
being treated differently from women. Whatever the outcome, the claim for the
same treatment and equal benefits were at issue in Sail'er Inn, Reed v. Reed,31
32 33 34Frontiero v. Richardson, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, Kahn v. Shevin, and
Rostker v. Goldberg.35 By the mid-1990s the easy questions had largely been
answered; questions of equity remained. What is fairness as between the
treatment of a pregnant woman and a man? What counts as sexual harassment?
Reflecting on the "nearly thirty years of analysis, aspirations and activism
directed toward achieving equality between women and men before the law"
that had passed since beginning work on the first edition, the authors of Sex-
Based Discrimination were sobered by how few of the obstacles to equality
28. SEX DISCRIMINATION 2D, supra note 24, at 146-47,167.
29. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
30. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
31. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
32. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
33. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
34. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
35. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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"have been overcome in ways that will endure, and by enduring, permit the
channeling of energies into new initiatives.,
36
For the authors of Sex-Based Discrimination, the sections into which the
book had originally been divided remained a reasonable conceptual structure
thirty years later, expandable enough to embrace new complexities. Indeed, by
their persistence the five chapters may suggest a skepticism about the depth of
change and a judgment about the endurance of discrimination. The cautious
chapter title of the first edition: "A Glance at Normative Aspects of the
Criminal Law in Delineating Sex Roles" shifted by the second edition to simply
"Women and Crime," a topic capacious enough to absorb crimes against
women and women as agents of the criminal justice system. The chapter on
"Sexual Interaction Within the Family" gradually expanded to include same-
sex marriage and "Family Life without Marriage."
The authors of Sex Discrimination and the Law took a different tack.
Responding to the national struggle that was engaged in the 1980s and 1990s
over what counts as sex discrimination, the casebook was reorganized along
sharply different lines, with new sections, among them "Beyond Traditional
Concepts of Facial Sex Discrimination," "Affirmative Action-Reverse Facial
Sex Discrimination," and "Disparate Impact-Discriminatory Effects on
Women." New categories account for several hundred additional pages.
Arguments about and efforts to clarify cloudy understandings of what counts as
discrimination appear in many other chapters; there are nearly 100 pages of
testimony by Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas and supplementary material from
Justice Thomas's confirmation hearings in 1991. "A rule," Nadine Taub and
Wendy Williams observed in 1985, can be "sex neutral on its face but not at all
neutral in the way it affects male and female employees., 37 The volume begins
with a 160-page narrative legal history of women in the United States from the
era of the American Revolution until the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in
Hoyt v. Florida, upholding the state's exemption of women from jury service
unless they themselves chose to register to place their names in the jury pool. 3 s
Although the appellant (a woman charged with murdering her husband) argued
that the law denied her a chance to be judged by a jury drawn from an
authentically random selection from the entire community, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered such a distinction benign.
A decade later such distinctions would be regarded as invidious; starting
with Reed v. Reed in 1971, the Burger Court would decide more than twenty
sex discrimination cases in rapid succession. The second edition of Sex
Discrimination and the Law conveyed to students even as they began their
work that conceptions of equality between men and women had been
36. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (5th ed.), supra note 6, at v.
37. SEX DISCRIMINATION 2D, supra note 24, at 920.
38. 368 U.S. 57(1961).
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problematic from the foundation of the republic. As the sex discrimination
casebooks were revised, they were joined on the shelves by others, which
claimed to have more theoretical perspectives: Feminist Jurisprudence, Gender
and the Law, Sex Equality. 39 Martha Chamallas has suggested that the turn
toward theory was forced by Supreme Court decisions in Geduldig v. Aiello,4 °
General Electric Company v. Gilbert4 1 and finally, California Federal Savings
and Loan v. Guerra,42 all of which required feminist litigators to struggle with
questions of sameness and difference between pregnant and "non-pregnant
persons," or, to put it in more familiar legal terms, between equality and equity.
To seek equity as well as equality required a delicately nuanced analysis of the
meanings of gender that did not always sit comfortably within traditional sex-
discrimination conceptualizations. Mary Joe Frug's casebook included in its
"Table of Authorities" works like philosopher Judith Butler's Gender Trouble,
French feminist Christine Delphy's Protofeminism and Antifeminism, and
Rosalyn Petchesky's Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics
of Reproduction. Frug began not with interpretative constitutional history but
with the place of women in the legal profession; her readers would start by
seeking to understand how they themselves embodied the contradictions of
gender that would be analyzed. This generation of casebooks were developed
as a new cohort of theorists were treating the very concept of "woman" as itself
unstable, the sexed body a less reliable foundation than it had once seemed for
agreements of what counts as equality. "Gender," writes Judith Butler, "is an
identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a
stylized repetition of acts.''43  The more the identity of "woman" was
understood to lie in performance as well as in biology, the harder equality
questions became.
But just those sort of equality questions were unavoidable when the Court
held that excluding pregnancy leave from employees' disability coverage was
not "sex discrimination." When Congress responded to Geduldig by requiring
pregnancy to be treated like any other disability, conceptual problems
remained, among them whether pregnancy is indeed a "disability" and whether
the new statute had any meaning in a work environment in which fringe
benefits did not include any sort of disability leave. These questions were
resolved temporarily by Justice Thurgood Marshall's memorable opinion
39. Among them: MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1992; 2d ed. Judith G. Greenberg,
Martha L. Minow, & Dorothy E. Roberts 1999); KATHARINE T. T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (1993; 2d ed. Katharine T. T. Bartlett and Angela Harris, 1998; 3d
ed. Katharine T. T. Bartlett, Angela Harris, & Deborah Rhode, 2002); MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT
BOWMAN, & MORRISON TORREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING
WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994, 2d ed. 2001). A notable recent addition to this group is CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2001).
40. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
41. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
42. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
43. See FRUG, supra note 39, at 79.
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sustaining a "statute that allows women, as well as men, to have families
"4without losing their jobs. But the struggle between what counted as
sameness and what counted as difference continued, and the new casebooks
organized their materials to make this struggle transparent.
45
As this second generation of casebooks now undergo their second and third
revisions, yet another generation of casebooks has emerged. Their focus is
simultaneously broader and more narrow; specific to an issue, but
simultaneously expanding understandings of the boundaries of civil rights and
tort claims, naming new harms. Thus a subject like domestic violence, which
even in casebooks that devote entire chapters to sexual coercion and woman
abuse, cannot be fully covered, now claims its own casebooks.46 In Battered
Women and the Law, Clare Dalton and Elizabeth M. Schneider can explore at
length the dimensions of a practice, domestic violence, that was not recognized
by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court until 199247 or the subject of major
federal legislation until 1994 but which has long been embedded in American
social practice-indeed, in the practices of virtually all societies of which we
know. Key cases, like State v. Wanrow which are treated in historical notes
or in brief selections in general sex discrimination cases, get full attention
here-Dalton and Schneider devote eight pages to the decision and comment
on it. They also have space for reflection on the role of social context, like
welfare and medical systems, and to spell out the conceptualizing of violence
against women as a violation of international human rights, devoting an entire
chapter to the work of United Nations, NGOs like Human Rights Watch, and
the ways in which claims for asylum are being reshaped .5
Lesbian and sometimes gay sexuality was a subject in sex discrimination
casebooks, especially when litigators made sameness/difference arguments that
were not unlike those that feminist litigators struggled with. Indeed, as Patricia
A. Cain has observed, "Gay and lesbian activists have learned from earlier civil
rights movements that the most workable legal arguments, especially in
litigation, are sameness arguments." Although sameness arguments are limited
by their implicit denial of all that is distinctive in gay and lesbian sexuality,
they have been, Cain writes, a crucial first stage:
44. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 47-52 (1999).
45. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 39; WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND
THE LAW (1993); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW (1997); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW
(1997).
46. BEVERLY BALOS & MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION (1994); and the expansive CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW (2001).
47. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
48. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
49. 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
50. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 46, at 992-1060.
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Once the sameness arguments established that, at the core, women and
men are equally able, a new starting point was established for
discussing difference. The proper treatment of pregnant workers, for
example, was not a serious topic of discussion until sameness
arguments had transformed the workplace into a place where women
and men were viewed as equal workers....s5
But the litigation strategies of sameness can play out differently when
sexuality is at issue; increasingly the subject demanded forthright attention of
its own. Indeed, as Katherine M. Franke has argued, the disaggregation of sex
from gender may well have been "the central mistake" of sex discrimination
law, limiting it at least at first to crude stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes and largely ignoring "the social processes that construct and make
coherent the categories male and female." 52 One result was the need to develop
a jurisprudence attentive to sexuality, related to but distinct from the rapidly
developing body of thought on sex discrimination. In the 1980s Mary C.
Dunlap (who as a member of Equal Rights Advocates had pioneered feminist
litigation in the 1970s) began teaching courses on sexuality and gay rights;
Tom Stoddard and Arthur Leonard did the same. A conference on sexual
orientation in the law school classroom held at Harvard Law School in 1989
seems to have played a role not very different from the women and the law
conferences of the early 1970s in creating an activist scholarly community.
Out of these courses, William Rubenstein developed the first casebook on the
subject53 : that book is now in its second edition.5 4  It has been joined by
William N. Eskridge Jr. and Nan Hunter's Sexuality, Gender, and the Law;
55
others are likely to appear in the near future.
56
Although they reflect social history, casebooks cannot themselves be social
histories. Their authors have a quite different agenda-they need to construct
an intellectual argument that imposes order on the confusion of hundreds,
thousands of episodes of litigation in any given year: choosing what to
emphasize, what is worthy of students' limited attention, where underlying
integrating themes are to be found. They exclude lived experience and the
contextual setting in favor of the logic of the developing argument. Even
though Ruth Bader Ginsburg was an author, one would never know from the
first edition of Sex-Based Discrimination's treatment of Reed the fascinating
story of how the case came before the Supreme Court, or know anything of the
51. PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN
AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000).
52. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1-3 (1995).
53. LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW (1993).
54. Its title is now CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1997).
55. Supra note 45.
56. For example, Art Leonard and Patricia A. Cain are preparing a casebook to be published by
Carolina Academic Press.
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role played by the ACLU's Women's Rights Project or of Ginsburg's role as its
director.5 7 Other authors also litigated some of the cases they report; in the
interests of both modesty and dispassion, their own roles are muted or invisible.
Organizing a book to emphasize themes damages chronology from the outset.
That there was collective work as well as individual complaint is masked; only
by implication-in what they select to print, in the study questions they
prepare, in their brief prefaces-do the authors offer glimpses of their own
personal engagement with the subject. The abstract tone is underscored by the
practice-still largely in place, but loosening-of identifying the attorneys on
both sides of the argument and the judges, even when authors of judicial
opinions, only by last name. Still, we can try to read underneath the rhetorical
scrim of timelessness and abstraction, and understand these books as the
artifacts of the social history of which they are a part.
Litigators, though, can't wait for casebooks. The breathless pace of
litigation and statutory change in the 1970s meant that more flexibility was
needed. New publications emerged to meet that need. One of them still
flourishes. The Women's Rights Law Reporter is somewhere between the
flimsy mimeographed handouts and the "permanent" casebooks. Making its
first appearance in the summer of 1971, the Reporter offered itself as "a new
weapon for women's lawyers" and promised to "cover developments in areas
of law which especially affect women as women," among them "education,
employment, health care, child care, domestic relations, abortion, sexual
freedom, prostitution, and the special problems of being female and poor or
female and a member of some other disfavored group, criminal law, and
constitutional law." The editors sought
the help of those actually working in the law. We need to know what
you are doing so others can learn from it. We are interested in strategy
and tactics for attacking specific legal problems. We are interested in
direct actions related to law, in books and articles, conferences and
caucuses. We are interested in theoretical writing and practical work.
We are interested in women's law courses and women's groups which
work through the law. We are interested in the women who work in
law: law students, law librarians, legal secretaries, lawyers, and all
other legal workers.58
The Reporter's advisory board was a dance card of lawyers long committed to
progressive feminist causes, who were at that moment engaged in expansive
litigation. Many were also developing the casebooks: Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Pauli Murray, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ann Freedman, Bernice Sandler of the
57. 1 have discussed this at length in Linda K. Kerber, Sally Reed Demands Equal Treatment, in
DAYS OF DESTINY 441-451 (Alan Brinkley and James MacPherson eds., 2001).
58. Back cover, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., Fall/Winter 1971. [NB: The Women's Rights Law
Reporter did not begin consecutive pagination until Volume 3 (1975-77).]
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Women's Equity Action League, Faith A. Seidenberg of NOW, Nancy Steams
of the National Lawyers Guild, and Arthur Kinoy of the Center for
Constitutional Rights. By the second issue, a year later, they could report the
triumph of Reed but also had to acknowledge the "financial realities" that
"forced us to abandon the idea of a self-sustaining journal and to become
essentially a volunteer organization," located at Rutgers Law School (where
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Nancy Steams and Nadine Taub were teaching) and
staffed by law students.
5 9
The Reporter, especially in its early issues, warms the heart of a historian.
The very first article in the first issue is a selection from the decision in
Bradwell v. Illinois6 0 and a biographical sketch of Myra Bradwell, thus
instructing readers that their own marginalization from the profession was
explicit and a century old. No one would mistake the Reporter for a traditional
law review: its two column layout was illustrated with photographs, cartoons
and sketches. 6 1 In the pages of the Reporter, feminist lawyers placed their
early reflections on issues that they engaged in their lives and in the courtroom:
Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Reed and then on Frontiero;62 Leigh Bienen, Alicia
Ostriker and J. P. Ostriker on sex discrimination in universities; 63 Lynn
Schafran on educating the judiciary about gender bias. 64 Eighty-seven-year-old
Mary G. Siegel contributed a lively account of her career as a lawyer,
beginning with taking night classes at New York University Law School in
1915 and 1916. She had arrived in the U.S. at the age of 15 in 1911, speaking
only Yiddish; she worked in sweatshops during the day and studied law at
night, eating her supper-a banana and a hard roll--en route from the
65sweatshop to the school. Explicitly historical and literary essays gradually
became rare, perhaps because the need for reassurance abated.66  Reflective
essays that would develop lives of their own appeared as working papers in the
Reporter: Leigh Bienen's series of essays and reports on national developments
59. The Reporter survived its first year thanks to a grant of $1,800 from the Wallace Eljabar
Foundation in New Jersey. Email from Leigh Bienen to Linda Kerber (Dec. 5, 2002) (on file with
author).
60. 83 U.S. (I Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that denying Myra Bradwell license to practice law
because she was a woman did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
61. Leigh Bienen recalls the struggle to persuade the Index to Legal Periodicals to list the Reporter.
Email from Leigh Bienen to Linda Kerber (Dec. 5, 2002) (on file with author).
62. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comment on Reed v. Reed, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., Spring 1972, at 7;
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comment: Frontiero v. Richardson, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., Summer 1973, at 2.
63. Leigh Bienen, Alicia Ostriker, & J.P. Ostriker, Sex Discrimination in the Universities: Faculty
Problems and No Solution, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., March 1975, at 3.
64. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary About Gender Bias: The National Judicial
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts and the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 109 (1986).
65. Mary G. Siegel, "Crossing the Bar": A "She" Lawyer in 1917, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 357
(1982).
66. But see Lenora Ledwon, Maternity as a Legal Fiction: Infanticide and Sir Walter Scott's The
Heart of Midlothian, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REtP. 1 (1996); Megan E. Abbott, The Servant's Gaze: Nelly
Dean's Rise to Power in Wuthering Heights, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 108 (1997).
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in rape law reform; 67 Wendy Webster Williams' "The Equality Crisis" in
1982;68 Elizabeth M. Schneider's "Describing and Changing: Women's Self
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" in 1986.
69
Occasionally the Reporter printed instructive amicus briefs; it devoted an
entire issue to those filed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.
7 1
The Women's Rights Law Reporter has recently celebrated its thirtieth
anniversary. It is still being published by Rutgers Law School, still a lively
student journal seeking "to challenge the traditional legal framework." The
page size and design remain the same; it still includes illustrations and the
occasional literary essay or memoir. Leigh Bienen, who was on the first staff
of students when it shifted to law school volunteers, and who now teaches at
Northwestern University Law School, serves on the advisory board; Ann
Freedman, Arthur Kinoy, and Eleanor Holmes Norton never left. The Reporter
still publishes a- mix of reflective essays, along with texts of speeches; book
reviews are now a regular part of the mix. Subscriptions cost $20 instead of
$12; in constant dollars that is probably a decrease. The Reporter now rests on
a comfortable financial foundation with a paid circulation of over 500, mostly
institutions.72 Back issues of these rare documents, that proudly preface each
issue with the assertion that "The Women's Rights Law Reporter is a Feminist
Legal Journal ... Founded in 1970," can be ordered from William S. Hein &
Co., 1285 Main Street, Buffalo, NY 14209.
The Women's Rights Law Reporter would be the first-and remains the
least bound by convention-of a new genre of feminist law reviews housed in
law schools. Some six years later, in 1977, the Harvard Women's Law Journal
was established, followed, in close succession, by Women and Law (founded at
Hofstra University in 1978); Women's Law Forum of the Golden Gate Law
Review (1979); Berkeley Women's Law Journal (1983); and Wisconsin
Women's Law Journal (1985). 73
67. Leigh Bienen, Rape 1, 3 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 45 (1976); Rape 11, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
90 (1977); Rape 11-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170
(1980); Rape IV, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. supp. (1980).
68. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture. Courts, and Feminism,
7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982).
69. Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self Defense Work and the Problem
of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986).
70. See, e.g., Nadine Taub, Amicus Brief: In the Matter of Baby M, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7
(1987).
71. See 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. (1989).
72. Email from Women's Rights Law Reporter editors to Linda K. Kerber (Dec. 9, 2002) (on file
with author).
73. Women's law journals continued to be founded throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including this
very publication-Yale Journal of Law and Feminism published its first issue in 1987. Other titles
could be added, but perhaps these are enough to convey the lively activity in the field. I am grateful to
Judith Resnik, Cori Van Noy, and Daphna Renan for creating a chronological list of women's and
gender law journals (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism).
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Feminists of the early 1970s invented yet another art form: the report of the
gender bias task force for the courts. A new generation of feminist litigators
quickly found that the usual courtesies of the bar often were not extended to
them; indeed they found a startling absence of civility in precisely the settings
that took pride in justice, fairness, and civility. They found that judges
routinely deployed clich6 and stereotype, refusing to treat women litigators as
authentic colleagues or to evaluate their clients' complaints on their merits.
Incivility undermined women's own ability to work professionally and
undermined their clients' rights to fair treatment. Lynn Hecht Schafran, who
still directs the National Judicial Education Program, begins the story of its
origins this way:
One of the first Title VII cases to challenge discrimination based on
sex was Weeks v. Southern Bell. [408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).] The
plaintiff, Lorena Weeks, was a clerical worker who wanted a job as a
switchman... [When Weeks lost at the district court she appealed to
the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded.] Her lawyer found the
judge "clearly uncomfortable with the notion of a woman doing a
man 's job. The judge made comments like, 'well, in this job you have
to know a lot about electricity and I can't even fix my own air
conditioner,' as if the inability of one man to deal with electrical
appliances meant that no woman could possibly handle them.",
74
Frustrations like these-and many worse-had long been part of the
experience of feminist attorneys and women clients. By 1970, a critical mass
of feminists had emerged from law schools. Thanks to Title VII, this was the
same time that a substantial number of discrimination cases were brought, all
vulnerable to dismissive attacks, and, as Schafran maintains, carrying "an
additional burden of proof for women." Among the most common burdens was
that victims needed to persuade judges and juries that sexual assault and sexual
harassment counted as aggression and violence, not as seduction. When the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund was established, its lawyers knew
that if they were to have any success at all they required a level playing field
and impartial judges. Individual episodes of patronizing judges were vulnerable
to easy excuses: it was an accident, insult was unintended, or an edgy feminist
had misinterpreted as patronizing what had been meant as courtesy or joke.
Episodes reported in one locality had little generalizable impact; other judges
simply thought "It couldn't happen in my state, my city, my courtroom." It took
ten years of experience before the breakthough decision to treat unfairness as a
matter of misunderstanding and judges as persons in need of education. As
Schafran tells it, women judges in California---only recently organized into the
National Association of Women Judges-took the lead in demonstrating that
unfaimess was widespread and that continuing education could be a useful
74. Lynn Hecht Schafran, California: First as Usual, 20 WOMEN'S RTs L. REP. 159-60 (2001).
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intervention; the first was a 1981 pilot course in California, "Judicial
Discretion: Does Sex Make a Difference?" 75
Thus when feminist lawyers, led by Norma Wikler and Lynn Hecht
Schafran, urged courts to establish their own research teams, coining the phrase
"the gender bias task force," it was an important analytical as well as political
move.76 When Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme
Court created the first gender bias task force in 1982 he established an
important precedent. It was now much easier for dozens of other courts to
agree that if there was a problem of unfairness in their courtrooms it was their
responsibility to identify and deal with it. And what they identified was
shocking. "From their entrance into the courthouse and throughout their
participation in the business of the courts," concluded the Gender Bias Study of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "female litigants, witnesses,
employees and attorneys are faced with unnecessary and unacceptable
obstacles that can be explained only in terms of their gender.
77
As Judith Resnik has insightfully argued, the strategies of the gender bias
task forces have been themselves novel rhetorical devices. Instead of the
model of the "white paper," a report prepared by "blue ribbon commissions,"
made up of "a few senior professionals with name recognition and pre-existing
authority," gender bias task forces have been composed of a wide range of
participants, bringing together judges, lawyers, academics and, sometimes,
non-professional citizens. Their reports, says Resnik, "claim authority by
capturing hundreds and thousands of voices, the stories of individual women
,,78and men in courts. Their strategies are multiple: social science methods for
gathering and analyzing aggregate data, anonymously authored thick
description of courtroom experiences, first person narratives. Direct quotation
of nasty comments made clear that women attorneys often could not count on
male attorneys as colleagues or that female judges could not count on respect
from court officials. 79 The results of these studies have been presented not only
in the form of traditionally published reports, but in performance-plays,
songs, dramatizations, even a film. The "melange of literary genres," Resnik
observes, "succeeded in... bringing forbidden questions of fairness into the
,,80halls of justice. We have, Lynn Hecht Schafran concludes, "created a legal
75. Id. at 161.
76. Judith Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices: Audiences and Authority in Law & Literature
and in Law & Feminism, in 11 LAW AND LITERATURE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 698 (Michael Freeman
and Andrew D. E. Lewis eds., 1999); see also Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women,
Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991).
77. Reprinted in FRUG, supra note 39, at 4.
78. Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices, supra note 76, at 700.
79. See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 39, at 5-11, 326-27.
80. Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices, supra note 76, at 702-04, 709.
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concept called 'gender bias in the courts' and it is institutionalized in the
law."
81
But bringing the questions of fairness in does not necessarily mean that
questions of fairness are resolved. The gender bias task force reports have their
own critics. The 2002 report of the New York State Judicial Committee on
Women in the Courts found dramatic improvement over the past fifteen years,
but also found that "women who divorce still fail to fare equitably by reason of
unrealistic expectations about women's earning power.... [V]ictims of
domestic violence all face higher standards for establishing credibility than
their abusers and women are not well represented on the State Supreme
Court. ... ",,82 It is likely that the klieg lights of the gender bias task force will
have to be kept on, focused on the courtroom stage, and with even more
difficulty, on the judges' chambers where so much of consequence is bargained
for. 83
In the year 2000, historians were frequently asked how the year 2000
differed from the year 1000. I confess that I was generally impatient with the
question; "How should I know?" I'd growl. "Better talk to a medievalist!" But
eventually I found a millenial comparison which I could offer. In the year
1000, wherever one looked on the globe, whatever form of social organization
we know, men generally monopolized positions of power and authority over
women, the family and the state. If we look at the year 1900, the same
generalization roughly held true. There was Queen Victoria, there were voting
women in Wyoming and elsewhere, but the only nation in which women could
vote was New Zealand. Positions of authority in the home and in the state were
still virtually monopolized by men.
In that context, the 1970s can be seen as a constitutional moment of
enormous significance-a time of major change in understandings of equality
in the U.S. and, indeed, of significant change internationally. In those years
women citizens framed their demands for social equality as legal demands;
journalists and popular writers responded with shelves full of legal advice. Part
of the social movement was a vast educational project, not only in women's
studies but also in women and the law. The popular press responded to the
occasion; books about the law aimed at non-professional audiences abounded.
84
81. Schafran, supra note 74, at 167: "Judges have sanctioned lawyers who exhibit this behavior,
judical conduct commissions have sanctioned judges, codes ofjudicial conduct now prohibit it expressly
for judges, lawyers and court personnel, and most important, appellate judges have reversed trial court
judges when gender bias undermines due process."
82. Press Release, New York State Unifed Court System (July 22, 2002) (available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/pr2002_ 13.html).
83. On judges' chambers as performative spaces, see Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices, supra
note 76, at 720.
84. Shana Alexander, for example, prepared a STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTS (1975); Ellen Switzer wrote THE LAW FOR A WOMAN: REAL CASES AND WHAT HAPPENED
(1975). Portions of this book were originally published in GLAMOUR, WOMAN'S DAY, and MCCALL'S.
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The first substantial cohort of women to experience law school without
ritualized humiliation matriculated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first
substantial cohort of feminists to enter state legislatures was elected in the early
1970s. The first substantial cohort of women judges was appointed in the mid-
and late 1970s.
As many dozens of feminist legislators rewrote the statutes on evidence in
rape trials, on inheritance, on the composition of state agencies; as many
hundreds of feminist law students challenged the curricula they inherited; and
as dozens of feminist lawyers and judges criticized the daily practices of the
courtrooms in which they worked, all of them also participated in the
development of a feminist legal literature. It is finally possible to appreciate
the originality of these literary forms. Read with skepticism and in a
comparative spirit, we can see them not as abstractions (although they often
deal with abstract ideas) but as living evidence of the historical context in
which they were made.
The next generation of casebooks will, in their turn, reflect the time in
which they are made. I think it is not difficult to predict that the expansive
international conversations in which feminists have been engaged in the last
decade, intensified by the crisis of 9/11, will soon reshape the existing
casebooks or prompt new categories and new casebooks of their own. The
final chapter of the first edition of Sex-Based Discrimination dealt with
comparative international law. Hesitantly titled "Comparative Side-Glances,"
the chapter called upon readers to turn to "foreign approaches and experience
as a means of gaining perspective," publicized "foreign solutions" notably in
Sweden, and called attention to the United Nations Charter and the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 85 This section slid out
of subsequent editions; other casebooks, even those on feminist theory, offered
only rare international comparisons. That elision was probably in large part the
result of the explosion of fresh issues and new litigation that the texts had to
cover. But an international dimension to Americans' understanding of women
and citizenship can no longer reasonably be postponed. We can see this from
the signal moments of the 1990s, when feminists were presented with evidence
of the atrocities being carried out in the Balkans and raised an international
demand that rape be understood as a war crime,86 and through the preparation
for the International Women's Year 1995, when some 35,000 women gathered
in Beijing to claim an agenda for change that was generally common across
national and cultural boundaries, and where Hillary Clinton's rallying call
"Women's Rights are Human Rights" resonated easily. Indeed, the intensity of
attentiveness has heightened: in the late 1990s efforts for the establishment of
85. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION, supra note 6, at 927-954.
86. UNICEF, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War, in THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN
(1996), available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm.
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an international criminal court, in struggles over the meanings of globalization,
and now, amid the frightening aftermath of 9/11.
Akira Iriye has recently argued that the entire field of diplomatic history is
about to undergo a major transformation, adding to the traditional international
history of nation-states a new transnational history of NGOs, the non-national
state actors that take transnational phenomena as their own agenda. We will be
writing about "refugees, poverty, hunger"-that is, women will be to a great
87extent our subjects . My informal impression, using law journals and the
newer casebooks as a guide to work in progress, is that focus on women's
treatment under international and comparative law has grown intensively in
recent years.88 Appeals for political asylum to escape genital mutilation or
sexual slavery have forced comparative consideration of what counts as fair in
U.S. law and what counts as fair in the law of other states. Sex trade that serves
U.S. tourists in South Asia and tricks women into prostitution near U.S.
military bases or in exchange for immigration, means that trafficking in women
is a crime to which U.S. policies must pay attention; indeed, a section of the
89Violence Against Women Act addresses just this. Subjects like the law of
marriage or domestic violence, that traditionally have been treated in the
context of U.S. domestic law and policy, are increasingly opened to analysis in
an international context. 9/11 drew attention to women in Afghanistan, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Iraq-what the results of this attention may be is far from
clear. The work of the 1970s can now be understood also as, among other
things, part of the expansion of Americans' understanding of the meaning of
87. Akira lriye, Where in the World is America? The History of the United States in a Global Age,
in RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE 53 (Thomas Bender ed., 2002).
88. Rhonda Copelon has been an especially strong voice in these developments. See, e.g.,
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 291, 297 (1994), Bringing Beiing Home, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 599 (1996), Gender Crimes as
War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 McGILL L.J. 217,
220-229 (2000). See also Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Sex, Gender and September 11, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 600 (2002); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 379 (1999); and Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of
Nationality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519 (2000).
89. A useful recent NGO report is JANICE G. RAYMOND, JEAN D'CUNHA, SITI RUHAINI
DZUHAYATIN, H, PATRICIA HYNES, ZORAIDA RAMIREZ RODRIGUEZ, & AIDA SANTOS, COALITION
AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WOMEN TRAFFICKED IN THE
MIGRATION PROCESS (March, 2002), available at www.catwintemational.org/index.php. See also
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464
(containing reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act).
90. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, International Human Rights as a Domestic Resource:
Thoughts on the Case of Women's Rights, NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming).; Ann Laquer Estin,
Human Rights, Pluralism, and Family Law, paper presented at International Society of Family Law,
l1th World Conference (August 2002) (on file with author). For casebooks, see especially
MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 24-42 ("Comparative Legal Equality Approaches"); 43-56 ("Sex
Equality Under International Law"); 452-82 ("Sex and Nation in Conflict"); 897-908 ("Rape Under
International Law"); and at "Trafficking Women," passim. For the recognition of these matters in the
newest casebooks, see, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 46, at chap. 14 (discussing domestic
violence as a violation of international human rights); and ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 45, at chap.
8, part 3 ("Sexuality and Citizenship in an International Setting").
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human rights. The history of the expansion of international human rights, if it
occurs at all, will be central to the history of our own time.
As we work to sustain and expand visions of justice, we can be buoyed by
the dreams of our predecessors for the reconfigurations of social relations and
of working life, of the very concepts of justice and equality. Among the
testimony to these dreams are feminists' case files and depositions (many of
them not fully useable by historians because of considerations of privacy),
papers formal and informal, photographs, newsletters, diaries, journals, and
other ephemera. And also serving as testimony to these dreams are the new
sorts of publications that feminists developed to fit their needs-as students, as
teachers, as litigators, as jurists. These new publications may be, from a
practitioner's point of view, outdated. But from the long perspective of those
who have lived through this great constitutional moment, these publications are
rare documents, and to be cherished.
For we need knowledge of our history to shape our work in the present.
We know that the work of feminists can be undone if we do not protect it.
Casebooks, reporters, law reviews, task force reports are all evidence of what
that work has been. And the agenda for the future is as wide-ranging as our
imaginations can stretch.
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